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WASBUSHv. GORE A HUMAN
RIGHTS CASE?
Gerald L. Neuman*
Nicholas Hatzis**
In a contested election, the state's highest court unexpectedly concludes, in light of the principles of its own constitution,
that the officially certified result should be set aside and recalculated because it employed a restrictive method that impaired the
counting of every vote. The initial winner moves the case to an
even higher authority, which rules that the state court's decision
itself violated the electorate's right to vote. It expresses concern
that the state court violated equality by creating a situation in
which votes are counted by different rules in different subjurisdictions of the state.
Sounds familiar? But this time the context was not the millennia! presidential election in the United States. It was the
Greek parliamentary election of 2004. and the second decision
was a ruling by the European Court of Human Rights, finding
that Greece's highest court had violated the international human
rights of the disappointed candidates. The judgment in Paschalidis v. Greece 1 affords a number of interesting perspectives
2
on Bush v. Gore, and on the brave new world of transnational
adjudication of election disputes.
1. WHAT HAPPENED IN ATHENS
The 2004 parliamentary election in Greece resulted in an
important shift from a government of the left to a government of
the right. After eleven years of rule, the Pan Hellenic Socialistic
Movement (PASOK) lost power to the New Democracy party
* J. Sinclair Armstrong Professor of International. Foreign. and Comparative
Law. Harvard Law School. Unlike Hatzis. Neuman does not read Greek.
** Lecturer in Law. City Law School. City University. London.
1. Paschalidis. Koutmeridis and Zaharakis v. Greece. App. Nos. 27863/05 et al.
(Eur. Ct. H.R. Apr. 10. 2008) (Judgment).
2. 531 U.S. 98 (2000).
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(ND ). led by Kostas Karamanlis, the nephew of party founder
and former President Konstantinos Karamanlis.' ND won a solid
majority, and the electoral litigation was not crucial to making
Karamanlis Prime Minister-in that respect, there was no similarity to the U.S. election of 2000.
Greece elects its parliament through a complicated scheme
of proportional representation. 4 The system seeks stability by
awarding a premium of seats to the plurality party, and it also reinforces the strength of small parties that exceed the minimum
threshold. For the 2004 election, allocation of seats to candidates
on party lists proceeded in three stages. At the first stage, seats
were distributed within multimember electoral districts by calculating an "electoral quotient'' equal to the total number of votes
divided by the number of seats for the district plus one. At this
stage, each party received as many seats as the integral number
of times its own vote score exceeded the electoral quotient.
(Thus, if the electoral quotient were 20,000, and the party won
45,000 votes, it would receive two seats at this stage.) At the next
stage, seats not yet allocated would be distributed based on vote
scores within a larger region.
The Paschalidis litigation concerned three parliamentary
seats won in districts in the region of Central Macedonia. The
reelection of P ASOK deputy Giorgos Paschalidis in the district
of Pella was challenged by losing ND candidate Parthena Fountoukidou before the Supreme Special Court (SSC), the competent court for parliamentary election disputes.; She questioned
the validity of some individual ballots, but more importantly she
claimed that the electoral quotient for Pella was wrongly calcu3. Both nephew and namesake. because "Kostas" is a nickname for "Konstantinos." The uncle (who died in 1998) had been the first Prime Minister and later President
of the Greek Republic established in 1974 after the fall of the military dictatorship. As
we will see. another of the current Prime Minister's uncles. Achilleas Karamanlis. was
also involved in the 2004 electoral saga. Meanwhile. the dynastic resemblance to Bush v.
Gore is heightened by the fact that PASOK was led in the 2004 elections by Giorgos Papandreou. son of P ASOK founder Andreas Papandreou. who had served as Prime Minister from 1981 until 1989 and from 1993 until his death in 1996. Andreas Papandreou's
immediate successor. Kostas Simitis. did not seek reelection in 2004.
4. See Prodromos D. Dagtoglou. Constitutional and Administrative Law. in
INTRODUCTION TO GREEK LAW 23. 34-35 (Konstantinos D. Kerameus & Phaedon J.
Kozyris eds. 3d ed. 2008). Its features have been repeatedly adjusted by prospective legislation. sometimes for partisan advantage. See Stratos Patrikios & Georgios Karyotis. The
Greek parliamentary election of 2007. 27 ELECTORAL STUD. 356. 357 (2008): see also G.
Kazamias and D. Papadimitriou. The elections in Greece, April 2000. 21 ELECTORAL
STUD. 649.650 (2002) (explaining the three-stage system).
5. See Anotato Eidiko Dikastirio [AED] [Supreme Special Court] 12/2005
(Greece) [hereinafter SSC Judgment 12/2005].
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lated, because the numerator included only the votes cast for the
various parties: it failed to add in the blank ballots presumably
cast as protest votes." As chance would have it, including the
modest number of blank ballots in the total would raise the electoral quotient for Pella sufficiently that P ASOK would earn only
7
one seat rather than two at the first stage of allocation. Paschalidis would lose his seat. Fountoukidou would gain hers at the
second stage, and additional repercussions would follow for
other candidates in Central Macedonia, including the election to
Parliament of Achilleas Karamanlis, an uncle of the new Prime
Minister.~

A possible difficulty for Fountoukidou's argument was that
blank ballots were not normally counted toward the electoral
quotient. Indeed the presidential decree implementing the electoral statute had been interpreted as excluding them, and the
SSC had previously held (in a 1999 decision involving European
Parliament elections) that the Greek Constitution did not require them to be counted.~ The SSC consists of eleven judges
drawn from the three highest courts. the Court of Cassation, the
Council of State, and the Court of Auditors. 10 The composition
6. Blank ballots in Greece are not regular party ballots left unmarked by the voter.
but special blank ballots provided by the government. They are unlikely to be cast by
mistake.
7. According to the SSCs calculation. 560 blank ballots were cast in Pella. and
including them raised the electoral quotient (total votes divided by five) from 23.462 to
23.574. PASOK received only 46.998 votes in Pella. which was more than twice 23.462.
but less than twice 23.574. Consequently. the SSC's judgment gave PASOK one rather
than two seats at the first stage. (The precise numbers were also affected by Fountoukidou·s challenges to specific ballots. but the resulting slight changes did not form part of
the debate at the European level.) See SSC Judgment 12/2005. para. 16: Application at 6.
Giorgos Paschalidis v. Hellenic Republic. App. No. 27863/05 (July 18. 2005) (hereinafter
Paschalidis Application].

8. See SSC Judgment 12/2005. paras. 18-20: Paschalidis Application. supra note 7.
at 5. (Understandably. the SSC Judgment mentions the name but not the relationship.)
Two other candidates. Efstathios Koutmeridis of PASOK and Konstantinos Zaharakis of
ND. also lost their seats as a result. and their claims were decided jointly with that of
Paschalidis by the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR). For simplicity. we will
focus on the case of Paschalidis.
9. Anotato Eidiko Dikastirio [AED] [Supreme Special Court] 34/1999 (Greece).
The SSC interpreted the law as making blank ballots an intermediate category between
valid ballots and invalid ballots: only valid ballots counted toward the electoral quotient.
See SSC Judgment 12/2005. para. 9.
10. See 2001 Syntagma (SYN] [Constitution] art. 100 § 2. (Greece). The SSC also
serves. under a different head of jurisdiction. as the court for authoritative resolution of
controversies on the constitutionality of statutes. /d. art. 100 § 1(e). Greece follows the
U.S. system of diffuse judicial review. under which all courts are authorized to rule on the
constitutionality of laws in cases properly before them. but the decisions of the sse
under Article 100(1)(e) have exceptional precedential effect. See Dagtoglou. supra note
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of the SSC panel convened for the hearing of Fountoukidou's
challenge also engendered dispute; it has been alleged that the
President of the Court of Auditors improperly removed himself
from the case in favor a junior Vice President of his Court who
had been appointed after the election. 11 However that may be,
the SSC ruled by six votes to five in favor of Fountoukidou's
1
challenge. "
The majority of the SSC found the exclusion of blank ballots from the calculation of the electoral quotient to be unconstitutional. It quoted provisions of the Greek constitution declaring
popular sovereignty as the foundation of government and describing its exercise in parliamentary elections, and noted the
corresponding provision of the European human rights convention. L' The majority emphasized parliamentary elections as the
most important vehicle of popular sovereignty, and the need for
equal treatment of all valid ballots. It maintained that the minimum legal effect guaranteed by the Constitution to all valid ballots-whether expressing positive support for a party or intentionally left blank-included counting them toward the electoral
quotient. Treating the blank ballots merely as a statistic to be reported would reduce them to the equivalent of invalid ballots,
and would not respect the free expression of the voter's will. The
legislature had discretion in structuring the electoral system, but
excluding valid blank ballots from the electoral quotient in parliamentary elections struck at the core of the principles of popular sovereignty and equality in voting and violated the Constitution.

4. at 31. 33. For an English language translation of the Constitution. see THE
CO:"STITUTION OF GREECE: AS REVISED BY THE PARLIAMENTARY RESOLUTION OF
APRIL 6TH 2001. OF THE VIITH REVISIONARY PARLIAMENT (2004). available al
www .parliament.gr/english/politeuma/syntagma. pdf.
11. See Paschalidis Application. supra note 7. at 5. 19. The SSC rejected a challenge
to the participation of the judge by 8 votes to 3. Anotato Eidiko Dikastirio (AED] (Supreme Special Court] 8/2005 (Greece). Paschalidis claimed in Strasbourg that he had
been denied an impartial tribunal by manipulation of the courfs composition. in violation of ECHR Article 6(1 ). but the European Court held (consistent with its precedents)
that Article 6(1) did not apply to the resolution of contested elections. Paschalidis.
Koutmeridis & Zaharakis v. Greece. App. Nos. 27863/05 et al. (Eur. Ct. H.R. 2006) (partial decision on admissibility): cf. Cheminade v. France. 1999-Il Eur. Ct. H.R .. App. No.
31599/96 (decision on admissibility) (stating that proceedings to resolve electoral disputes
lie outside scope of Article 6(1)).
12. The disputed Vice President was among the six: the SSC judgment identifies the
five dissenters. See SSC Judgment 12/2005. para. 10.
13. /d. para. 10 (quoting 2001 Syntagma (SYN] (Constitution] art. 1 §§ 2. 3: art. 5
§ 1. art. 51 § 3: art. 52 (Greece) (citing Article 3 of Protocol 1. infra note 18).
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The SSC judgment also set forth the dissenting view of five
judges, and the particular view of one of them. ~ The five argued
that, although the Constitution implicitly guaranteed the right to
cast blank ballots, the legislature could legitimately differentiate
between the effects of ballots choosing a party and ballots expressing no choice, in relation to the current system of representation. In addition, one dissenter wrote separately that the Con1
stitution favored stability in electoral law. ' that the present
decision departed without justification from the SSC's 1999 decision, and that the legislation sufficiently respected the free will
of the voters by enabling them to cast a blank ballot and have it
tabulated and reported. (The majority opinion did not expressly
1
respond to the claim of inconsistency with its own precedent. ")
Under the Greek Constitution. the SSC is the final judge of
electoral disputes. 17 Thus, Fountoukidou prevailed and took her
seat in Parliament. But that was not the end of the story, because
Paschalidis sued Greece before the European Court of Human
Rights in Strasbourg. He argued that the deprivation of his seat
violated the European Human Rights Convention.
1

2. WHAT HAPPENED IN STRASBOURG
Paschalidis challenged the SSC's decision under the free
elections provision of the European human rights system, Article 3 of Protocol No. 1. ~ That provision guarantees "free elections ... under conditions which will ensure the free expression
of the opinion of the people in the choice of the legislature." The
1

14. !d. para. 10. (The views of the dissenting judges are appended to the same
lengthy paragraph that set forth the argument of the majority.).
15. An amendment to the Greek Constitution in 2001 provided that legislative
changes in electoral law would not apply until after an intervening election. unless parliament voted by 2/3 majority to give them immediate effect. See 2001 Syntagma [SYN]
[Constitution] art. 54 § 1 (Greece). This amendment decreases the abilitv of an incumbent majority to fine-tune the system in anticipation of imminent electi.ons. See supra
note 4.
16. Speculatively. one might attempt to reconcile the two decisions by distinguishing European elections from national parliamentary elections. which the majority had
emphasized as central to the constitutional conception of popular sovereignty. But the
majority did not expressly offer this reconciliation. and the Greek gmernment did not
later argue it to the ECtHR.
17. See 2001 Syntagma [SYNJ [Constitution] arts. 5R. 100 § l(a) (Greece).
18. Protocol No. 1. Mar. 20. 1952. E.T.S. 9. 213 U.l\.T.S. 262. adjoined additional
rights to the [European] Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. Nov. 4. 1950. E.T.S. 5. 213 U.N.T.S. 222. Article 3 prmides: "The High
Contracting Parties undertake to hold free elections at reasonable intervals bv secret bal·
lot. under conditions which will ensure the free expression of the opinion of the people in
the choice of the legislature ...
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European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) has long construed
it as protecting the individual's right to vote, the individual's
right to stand as candidate, and the right of elected candidates to
exercise their legislative offices.
A chamber of the ECtHR gave judgment in April 2008,
holding unanimously that Greece had violated Article 3. 19 The
ECtHR had no objection to the counting of blank ballots per se.
Article 3 leaves the European states considerable discretion (a
wide "margin of appreciation'') to structure their electoral systems, adapting them to their own visions of democracy. Limitations on electoral rights must serve legitimate goals, and must
not be disproportionate to those ends. Including blank ballots in
the electoral quotient, and viewing that inclusion as required by
principles of popular sovereignty or electoral equality, fell within
the state's proper discretion.
But the ECtHR objected to the SSC's changing the rules in
the midst of the election. Once the choice of the people has been
freely expressed, retroactive changes in the system should not
nullify that choice. unless grounds of pressing significance to the
democratic order require it. The SSC's revision of Greek constitutional doctrine. invalidating the laws then in force, was unforeseeable by the voters and the candidates. It changed the meaning
of the casting of blank ballots from a disavowal of the political
parties to a vote in their favor. The Greek government had not
put forward any special justification for this change. (It had defended the merit of the new interpretation, and argued that the
ECtHR should not obstruct progressive development of constitutional doctrine.'") Moreover, applying the new constitutional
19. The mills of justice grind slowly in Strasbourg. because the ECtHR is overburdened with thousands of cases. Paschalidis filed his application in July 2005: the ECtHR
issued an initial admissibility decision in October 2006. a further admissibility decision in
September 2007. and its judgment on the merits on AprillO. 2008.
The ECtHR does have a procedure for accelerating its consideration of cases by giving them "priority ... See EUR. CT. H.R .. RULES OF COURT. Rule 41 (2007). The ECtHR
did not employ this procedure in Paschalidis or in any of the previous voting rights cases
cited elsewhere in this Article. While this Article was in press. however. the ECtHR did
decide one voting rights case as a matter of priority. Tanase and Chirtoaca v. Moldova.
App. No. 7/08 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Nov. 18. 2008) (finding that a 2008 statute banning officeholding by dual nationals violated Article 3 of Protocol No. 1). After the Council of
Europe's Commission against Racism and Intolerance and a committee of the Parliamentarv Assemblv of the Council of Europe had criticized the new restriction, the
ECtHR gave it piiority in order to reach a decision in advance of the 2009 legislative
elections. See id. paras. 4. 35-37.
20. See Observations of the Greek Government on the Applications at 16-17. Paschalidis. Koutmeridis & Zaharakis v. Greece. App. Nos. 27863/05, 28422/05 & 28028/05.
(2007).
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rule only in the region of Central Macedonia created an inequality between voters in different parts of Greece, inconsistent with
the principle of equal treatment implied in Article 3.
The ECtHR also considered it significant that the Greek
parliament had enacted a new electoral statute in 2006 that rejected the counting of blank ballots toward the electoral quotient. This factor underlined the uniqueness of the SSC's deci•

SlOn.
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Accordingly, the ECtHR concluded that Greece had violated the rights of Paschalidis under Article 3 of Protocol No. 1,
and ordered Greece to compensate him for his loss of income
during the parliamentary term- which had already ended.
3. COMPARISONS, AT TWO LEVELS
Neither Paschalidis nor the ECtHR cited Bush v. Gore, and
the comparison might be unwelcome in Europe. But does Paschalidis shed a retrospective favorable light on the U.S. Supreme
Court's intervention in the 2000 election?
The Florida Supreme Court, it will be recalled, had construed Florida election laws in light of a perceived mandate of
the state constitution to "safeguard the right of each voter to express his or her will in the context of our representative democracy."22 After the United States Supreme Court expressed uncertainty about the role the state constitution played in the decision,
21. At first glance. this observation is puzzling. because the 2006 statute may simply
be unconstitutional. as the SSC's decision implies. See id. at 19. A holding to that effect
would not be unforeseeable. but none has yet occurred. The 2006 law was applied without challenge in the 2007 parliamentary election. Meanwhile. a challenge on a slightly
different issue. the failure to count blank ballots in determining the percentage of the
vote required to avoid a run-off in mayoral elections. is pending before the Greek Council of State. A chamber of the Council of State upheld the exclusion of blank ballots as
within the legislature's discretion: one dissenter argued that the exclusion violated the
constitutional principles of popular sovereignty and voter equality as articulated by the
SSC: and the case has been referred to the Plenarv Session of the Council of State. See
Symboulion Epikrateias [SE] [Supreme Administ;ative Court] 117/2008 (Third Chamber. Council of State. Greece).
22. Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd. v. Harris. 772 So. 2d 1220. 1237 (Fla. 2000).
vacated sub nom. Bush v. Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd .. 531 U.S. 70 (2000). The
Florida court began its discussion by quoting article 1. section 1 of the Florida Constitution: "'All political power is inherent in the people. The enunciation herein of certain
rights shall not be construed to deny or impair others retained by the people.·· /d. at
1236. Compare 2001 Syntagma [SYN] [Constitution] art. I. ~§ 2. 3 (Greece). quoted by
the sse at the outset of its analvsis:
2. Popular sovereignty is the foundation of government.
3. All powers derive from the People and exist for the People and the Nation:
they shall be exercised as specified by the Constitution.
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and the possible incompatibility of such a role with the U.S.
Constitution's assignment of authority over the choice of Presidential electors to the state legislatures, the Florida Supreme
Court revised its approach to emphasize protection of voters'
23
rights as a statutory policy. The U.S. Supreme Court then
stayed the recount on December 9, 24 and ordered it permanently
25
halted on December 12. Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice Scalia,
and Justice Thomas concluded that the Florida Supreme Court
had "impermissibly distorted" the Florida election laws, changing them from ''the law of the State as it existed prior to the action of the court,'' and had usurped the power "to step away
from [the] established practice [and] to depart from the legisla26
tive scheme. " The per curiam opinion that received majority
support did not make this interpretive argument central to its
decision on the merits, but found a violation of the Equal Protection Clause in the Florida Supreme Court's method of ordering a
recount, allowing the local bodies implementing its order to apply nonuniform standards for determining the validity of ballots1
including those that contained the famous "dimpled chad." 2 '
With regard to the remedy, both components of the majority rejected the Florida Supreme Court's zeal to continue counting
votes, ~ind.ing that it had improperly int~~preted the state law's
authonzatiOn of an "appropnate remedy. Through the lens of Paschalidis, one can imagine how an international human rights tribunal might have condemned the
Florida Supreme Court's actions. Rather than vindicating the
Florida electorate's right to vote, 2y the Florida court's unforeseeable revision of past practices might be seen as changing the effect of the ballots already cast, diluting the strength of the vote
of citizens who had scrupulously followed the official instructions."' Variations in the methods of counting the ballots might

n. See Gore v. Harris. 772 So.2d 1243 (Fla. 2000). m·'d sub nom. Bush v. Gore. 531
U.S. 98 (2000): Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd. v. Harris. 772 So.2d 1273 (Fla. 2000).
24. Bush v. Gore. 531 U.S. 1046 (2000).
25. Bush\. Gore. 531 U.S. 98. 110 (2000).
26. /d. at 114-15. 120 (Rehnquist. C.J.. concurring).
27. !d. at 105-09 (per curiam).
28. /d. at 110-11: id. at 121-22 (Rehnquist. C.J .. concurring).
29. See, e.g.. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. art. 25. Mar. 23.
1976 ("Everv citizen shall have the right ... without unreasonable restrictions ... (b) To
vote ... at g~nuine periodic elections which shall be held by universal and equal suffrage
and shall be held by secret ballot. guaranteeing the free expression of the will of the electors ...... ). The United States ratified the Covenant in 1992.
30. The reliance interests affected bv this change were arguably weaker than the
reliance interests in Paschalidis. where the ·voters who cast blank ballots probably did not
intend to confer an advantage on one party over another. On the other hand. conceivably
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also be seen as creating inequalities between voters in different
counties. Recognizing the Florida court's interpretation of state
law as a revision could require the international tribunal to form
its own judgment about the meaning of domestic law, but it is
not uncommon for international tribunals in human rights cases
to examine domestic officials' interpretation of domestic law
(perhaps deferentially), in order to determine whether they have
a legal basis or whether they are unfairly retroactive, or whether
they are not sufficiently definite to avoid arbitrary application."
The remedy ordered for the human rights violation in Paschalidis differed from the remedy for which Bush v. Gore is famous. The ECtHR declared that the Convention had been violated (regarding this vindication as itself a remedy for
Paschalidis), and ordered payment of lost earnings and costs.
But it did not give Paschalidis his seat in parliament. In part, that
resulted from the passage of time: processing the case in Strasbourg took almost three years, and by the time the ECtHR rendered judgment, new elections had been held. 32 In part, that results from the remedial caution of the ECtHR, which has slowly
expanded its understanding of its authority to order performance
of actions (such as release of prisoners) instead of payment of
compensation. Moreover, Paschalidis did not request a preliminary injunction (known in the European human rights system as
"interim measures" 31 ) to avoid irreparable harm pending the
ECtHR's decision. The ECtHR has been relatively sparing so far
in its use of interim measures, though some human rights tribunals have been more expansive. 34 If the U.S. Supreme Court
some Florida voters deliberately cast paper ballots that expressed no preference among
the presidential candidates. but on which election officials could imagine a dimpled chad.
31. See, e.g.. Maestri v. Italy. 2004-I Eur. Ct. H.R .. App. No. 39748/98 (Grand
Chamber) (finding that Italian law did not provide sufficient notice that membership in a
Masonic lodge would result in disciplinary sanctions): Jahn v. Germany. 2005-VI Eur. Ct.
H.R .. App. Nos. 46720/99 et. a! (Grand Chamber) (concluding that first statute left
claimants' property rights uncertain. and that subsequent corrective statute did not unfairly deprive them of property): Achour v. France. 2006-IV Eur. Ct. H.R.. App. No.
67335/01 (Grand Chamber) (finding that application of amended recidivism laws to subsequent offense was foreseeable and did not violate prohibition on retroactive criminal
laws): P.G. v. United Kingdom. 2001-IX Eur. Ct. H.R .. App. No. 44787/98 (finding that
British law provided insufficient legal basis for covert recording. even inside police stations).
32. See Patrikios & Karyotis. supra note 4. at 356 (discussing Greek parliamentary
election of September 2007).
33. See Mamatkulov v. Turkey. 2005-I Eur. Ct. H.R.. App. Nos. 46827/99 et a!.
(Grand Chamber). In that case. the ECtHR reviewed the practice of international tribunals regarding variously named remedial orders pendente lite, and changed its jurisprudence to hold that interim measures are binding.
34. See The "'La Naci6n"' Case. Provisional Measures (Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. Sept. 7.
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could find that staying the Florida recount was necessary to
avoid irreparable harm, then someday an international tribunal
might also find interim measures appropriate in an election
case. "
Alternatively, one could look at Bush v. Gore itself through
the same lens. From the international human rights perspective,
the U.S. Supreme Court's unprecedented intervention in the
presidential election might also be seen as violating the right to
vote. The majority's interpretation of the Equal Protection
Clause was unforeseeable, and has not been applied to later
elections. The concurrence's application of Article II was also
novel. The majority's remedial rulings were an astonishing departure from prior practice in resolving disputed presidential
elections. As Paschalidis illustrates, the fact that a national supreme court is construing the nation's own constitution in taking
control of an election does not formally immunize the decision
from international human rights scrutiny. Thus, the perspective
Paschalidis affords on the resolution of the 2000 U.S. election is
equivocal-it lends support to both sides.
For those who regard the Supreme Court's decision in Bush
v. Gore as rescuing the nation from the "train wreck" that the
constitutionally specified procedures for resolving disputed
presidential elections would have produced,'" the Paschalidis decision may have articulated the relevant defense. Grounds of
pressing significance to the democratic order could justify a
court in revising its doctrine in the midst of an election challenge. In European human rights law, the right to vote is not absolute, and constitutional provisions are not sacrosanct when

2001). available at http://www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/medidas/lanacion_se_04_ing.pdf (ordering suspension of enforcement of libel judgment against journalist).
It is not clear how Greece would have responded if the ECtHR had ordered that
Paschalidis be restored to office. In the Greek legal system. treaties are hierarchically
superior to statute but inferior to the Constitution. 2001 Syntagma [SYN] [Constitution]
art. 28 (Greece); Dagtoglou. supra note 4. at 25. Greece can pay compensation to Paschalidis without violating its Constitution. but compliance with a restoration order might
have required either a constitutional amendment or a voluntary revision of interpretation
bv the sse.
· 35. See Bush v. Gore. 531 U.S. 1046. 1047 (2000) (Scalia. J .. concurring) (justifying
the stay order); cf Hoblock v. Albany County Bd. of Elections. 422 F.3d 77. 96-98 (2d
Cir. 2005) (affirming preliminary injunction against certifying election outcome without
counting absentee ballots): Marks v. Stinson, 19 F.3d 873. 886-87 (3d Cir. 1994) (affirming preliminary injunction unseating candidate who allegedly won by fraud. but reversing
preliminary injunction seating his opponent).
36. See. e.g.. Richard A. Posner. Florida 2000: A Legal and Statistical Analysis of the
Election Deadlock and the Ensuing Litigation. 2000 SUP. Cf. REV. 1. 49-50 (2001).
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they themselves violate human rights. Again, opinions differ on
whether the Supreme Court avoided a disaster.
Of course, one might also hold Paschalidis to a mirror, and
37
ask how foreseeable the ECtHR's decision was. The ECtHR
had not decided a case of this kind as of 2004-2005, when the
relevant acts occurred. The ECtHR had decided cases about the
disenfranchisement of classes of voters,'' about discriminatory
electoral structures, 39 about membership in banned political parties,40 and fact-specific cases about disqualification of candidates!1 In 2006, while Paschalidis was pending in Strasbourg, the
ECtHR condemned the SSC's retroactive application of a constitutional amendment in Greece to remove a sitting member of
Parliament.42 Thus, there were elements that would support a

37. Foreseeable or not. the decision has not been controversial. In part that may be
because the delayed decision had no direct consequences for the composition of the legislature: moreover. the panel of European judges (unlike the SSC panel) was not suspected of having partisan interest in the outcome of a contest between two mainstream
democratic parties in Greece. The basic principle of regional adjudication of human
rights disputes is also well-established in Greece.
38. See Labita v. Italy. 2000-IV Eur. Ct. H.R .. App. No. 26772/95 (Grand Chamber)
(disenfranchisement of suspected Mafioso despite acquittal violated Article 3 of Protocol
1): see also Hirst v. United Kingdom (No.2). 2005-IX Eur. Ct. H.R.. App. No. 74025/01
(Grand Chamber) (disproportionately broad disenfranchisement of imprisoned criminals
violated Article 3 of Protocol 1. affirming March 2004 Chamber decision): Campagnano
v. Italy. 2006-IV Eur. Ct. H.R.. App. No.77955/01 (disenfranchisement due to bankruptcy
violated Article 3 of Protocol 1).
39. See Matthews v. United Kingdom. 1999-I Eur. Ct. H.R.. App. No. 24833/94
(Grand Chamber) (exclusion of Gibraltar residents from European Parliament elections
violated Article 3 of Protocol 1): Aziz v. Cyprus. 2004-V Eur. Ct. H.R .. App. No.
69949/01 (Second Section) (disenfranchisement of Turkish Cypriots violated Article 3 of
Protocol 1 ).
40. See Selim Sadak v. Turkey. 2002-IV Eur. Ct. H.R.. App. Nos. 25144/94 et a!.
(dismissal from parliament of member of banned party was disproportionate and violated Article 3 of Protocol1). The ECtHR has tended to decide cases directly challenging
the prohibition of a party under the rubric of freedom of association rather than electoral
rights. See United Communist Party of Turkey v. Turkey. 1998-I Eur. Ct. H.R .. App. No.
19392/92 (Grand Chamber) (premature dissolution of party violated Article 11): Refah
Partisi v. Turkey. 2003-11 Eur. Ct. H.R .. App. Nos. 41340/98 eta!. (Grand Chamber) (upholding dissolution of Islamist party).
41. See Podkolzina v. Latvia. 2002-11 Eur. Ct. H.R.. App. No. 46726/99 (arbitrary
disqualification of candidate for insufficient fluency in Latvian): Melnychenko v.
Ukraine. 2004-X Eur. Ct. H.R.. App. No. 17707/02 (finding arbitrary disqualification of
candidate due to temporary refuge abroad). The ECtHR has also rejected certain challenges to minimum percentage thresholds for inclusion of political parties in legislatures
based on proportional representation: a case of that kind was pending before the Grand
Chamber at the time of the Paschalidis decision.
42. Lykourezos v. Greece. 2006-VIII Eur. Ct. H.R.. App. No. 33554/03. In that decision. mentioned prominently in both Paschalidis's written submission and the judgment. the ECtHR had found improper the application of a 2001 constitutional amendment. which forbade members of parliament to practice. to an attornev elected in 2000.
even with regard to professional activity in 2003.
·
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further extension of the case law, but nothing on point before
2008.
The ECtHR did censure another vote counting decision two
months earlier. in Kovach v. Ukraine. 43 In that case, a different
chamber of the court found that a local electoral commission had
acted arbitrarily in violation of Article 3 by discarding all the
votes in four wards after reports of minor irregularities. 44 The
Ukrainian courts had held that the local electoral commission
had exclusive authority to decide what circumstances justified
disregarding all the votes in an electoral division, and the
ECtHR criticized the commission for failing to explain why the
very low numbers of alleged irregularities required so disproportionate a sanction, which had conveniently reversed the out4:'i
come.
The closeness of the ECtHR's examination of elections appears to be increasing. At the same time, the remedial consequences of its fact-specific decisions have often been limited. In
most of these cases, as in Paschalidis, the ECtHR has found a
violation after the term in question has already expired, and orders compensation on grounds that will not be exactly repeated.
Its voting rights decisions have greater prospective effect when
they invalidate disenfranchisement rules, or discriminatory electoral structures.
The other active international human rights court, the InterAmerican Court of Human Rights (IACtHR), which is less inhibited about remedies.-~~> issued a decision with broad prospec47
tive implications in its YATAMA case of 2005. The IACtHR
found that the right to political participation under the American Convention on Human Rights guaranteed the right of candidates to run without belonging to a political party, and the
right of organizations to field candidates without structuring
themselves as a political party, if that structure was inappropriate to their needs ..m It ordered Nicaragua to adapt its electoral
laws to the organizational needs of indigenous and ethnic minor43. Kovach v. Ukraine. App. No. 39424/02 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Feb. 7. 2008). This
roughly contemporaneous decision was not cited in Paschalidis.
44. /d. para. 61.
45. /d. para. 60.
46. See Gerald L. Neuman. Import, Export, and Regional Consent in the InterAmerican Court of Human Rights. 19 EUR. J. IN'TL L. 101. 104-05 (2008) (discussing the
remedial activism of the !ACt HR. and its difficulties in inducing compliance).
47. Case of Y AT AMA v. Nicaragua. 2005 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 127 (June 23. 2005).
48. /d. paras. 215-20.
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ity communities. The IACtHR also held that the provisions of
the Nicaraguan constitution that established the Supreme Electoral Council as an independent fourth branch of government
whose decisions on elections were not subject to judicial review
violated the right to judicial protection under the American
Convention, and ordered Nicaragua to make provision for such
49
review. Nicaragua has not rejected this decision. but three years
later it was only in early stages of deliberation on implementing
the ordered reforms, including changes to its constitution, and
had not yet paid the damages awarded by the court.'0
The United States is not a party to the American Convention on Human Rights, and has not accepted the jurisdiction of
an international court to adjudicate claims of human rights violations brought against it, in electoral disputes or otherwise. Other
democracies have joined regional systems of binding human
rights adjudication. National courts in such regimes have seen
their creativity flanked by new forms of accountability that they
cannot silence by claiming the mantle of constitutional authority.
Their experience in voting rights cases, as in other fields, is revealing once more that supreme courts of any system are infallible only to the extent that they are final, in time and in space.

49. /d. paras. 170-76.
50. See Case of YATAMA v. Nicaragua. Supervision of Compliance \\ith Judgment (InterAm. Ct. H.R. Aug. 4. 2008). available at http://www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/supervisiones/
yatama_04_08_08_ing.pdf.

